Meeting the United States Requirement for a Merchant Marine by Drake, John F.
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Theses and Major Papers Marine Affairs
4-24-1978
Meeting the United States Requirement for a
Merchant Marine
John F. Drake
University of Rhode Island
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds
Part of the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons
This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Drake, John F., "Meeting the United States Requirement for a Merchant Marine" (1978). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 68.
GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSI~ OF RHODE ISLAND
MEETING THE UNITED STATES REQUIREMENT
FOR A
MERCHANT MARINE
A RESEARCH PAPER
FOR
MARINE AFFAIRS
BY
JOHN F. DRAKE
NORTH KINGSTON, R. t.
24 April 1978
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . • . • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. UNITED STATES NEED FOR A MERCHANT MARINE ...•..•.••........... 3
III. HISTORY OF THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE ..••..••••.••••••.•••..•• 9
IV. STATUS OF THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE TODAy ...••.•............. 20
V. MEETING REQUIREMENTS WITH TODAY'S FLEET ••..•.....•....•...... 27
VI. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION .•.......•..•.....••..•••••.•••. 31
VII. PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE ...•....•••••.•••••••.•...••.•••....... 37
INTRODUCTION
The United States Merchant Marine has been rescued from woeful inadequacy
several times in this Q.entury by fortuitously-timed crash programs of massive
government support and by some extraordinary wartime feats of American ship-
builders. Not since the days of sail, when its clipper ships took on all
comers, has the United States Merchant Marine as a whole been a "winner"
commercially on its own in world shipping competition. Nor have considerations
of national security been sufficiently compelling in peacetime to ensure that
the numbers and types of ships required for military resupply operations would
be available in emergencies. There has been a lack of agreement on what the
needs of the United States are for a merchant marine. There is even less
concurrence inside and outside the industry as to what types of action should
be taken to cure the ills of the current U. S. shipping industry. to maintain
a U.S.-flag merchant fleet in the international competition for world trade,
or to ensure that ships are available in types and numbers required for the
many support roles that must be filled in wartime or other national emergencies.
As a matter of fact, from time to time there have been questions raised
as to whether a U. S. merchant marine was required at all. Several critics
have stat~d that they saw no harm in having staunch allies like the Norwegians.
the Danes, the Dutch, and the British hauling U. S. cargo. They claimed that
there was neither economic nor political justification for a U. S. merchant
fleet. the U. S. Department of Defense at one point in the 60's even indicated
that it didn't need a merchant marine for defense purposes. The experience
1
of supplying Vietnam requirements quickly disproved that denial of need.,
The negative arguments persist nonetheless, citing the fact that U. $. allies
own the preponderance of world shipping, contending that U.S.-owned foreign-flag
2.
ships can be made available in emergencies under U. S. control, and claiming
that much of the material required for future military contingencies will go
by air:. Proponents of a strong iU. S. merchant marine for commercial and
defense purposes point out fallacies in counting on the availability of I1NATO
pool" ships, or even on "flags of convenience" ships for U. S. 5upp-prt require-
ments. They point to the unpredictability of future wars. Although they agree
that airlift will be required, they also recognize a need for sealift for
operational flexibility, and for ships to carry the bulk of war materials,
just as they did during World War II, the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam effort.
There have been many statements and many studies of the need for a U. S.
merchant marine in recent years. According to Gilmore and Black~ in "Law of
the Admiralty", these have often been characterized by "bum-dope peddling" by
"interested parties", and there are few disinterested studies f'rom which to
glean facts. Rowever, according to tQese authors we should not be blinded to
the fact that "there is high plausibility at least in the assertion that
strategic considerations require the maintenance of a merchant marine. Of what
kind is ana ther matter". 2 This paper will derive the United States' needs for
a merchant fleet from the facts available, and will express these needs in
terms which can be used to form reasonable goals. The history of the U. S.
Merchant Marine will then be examined to learn how it arrived at its present
status. Successes and failures of industry practices and government support
programs will be highlighted, and an examination will be made of the degree to
which the needs of the United States can be met with today's U. S. merchant
fleet. Alternative courses of action will be analyzed~ with a view toward
proposing a program of continuing U. S. Government encouragement, support and
3.
control with which to gain and maintain a merchant ~rine truly adequate for
the needs of the United States.
UNITED STATES NEED FOR A MERCHANT MARINE
Seapower should be more important to the United States today than ever
before in the nation's history. Ties with friends and allies ground the world
are maritime, and the presence of the U. S. flag in other areas is a stabilizing
political factor. To exert influence or to employ power almost anywhere in
the world involves URe of the seas. Recognition of this basic fact is quite
evident in the dramatic growth of all aspects of Soviet seapower in recent
years. And this Soviet expansion is another cause for concern to U. S. sea-
power advocates. The most significant reason why seapower should be more
important to the United States today however, comes from the country's
increasing dependence on imports from overseas. With only six percent of the
world's population, the United States consumes one-third of the world's energy.
Much of the fuel to generate this energy carnes from abroad. 69 of 71 critical
materials are imported in whole or in part. Putting these facts together with
other evidences of dependence on external sources for essential goods, one
writer described the United States as having become, or fast becoming, an
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"island nation". He was not referring to an island in the physical sense.,
but rather in the sense that an island is completely dependent on maritime
ties for the preservation of its society. Just as England became an island
nation about the time of the Napoleonic Wars when it became a net importer of
food, and as Japan became one when that nation industrialized after the Meije
Revolution (making the economy dependent upon raw materials and energy
resources imported by sea, and society completely dependent upon that industrial
4.
economy), so the United States is now becoming similarly dependent upon the
sea. 'Maritime power is vital to an island nation, and one of the major
elements of such maritime power is a strong merchant marine. Other elements
include a powerful navy and adequate support for sea-going forces in the
form of population, shipbuilding. ports, faciiities and financing.
Almost one-half of what the world produces in the way of minerals makes
it~ way to the United States, and the products of U. S. farms ahd industtry
are found in virtually all the markets of the world. The common medium of
interchange of the~e goods is ships carrying cargoes. Thus. the argument is
made, the United States Merchant Marine is needed to maintain the lifelines
to overseas buyers and sellers in nonnal times, and is even more essential
in time of war. Proponents of this argument support it with data showing
that ships controlled by the United States War Shipping Administration (WSA)
carried 80% of all supplies in the Allied war efforts of World War II. They
also point out that practically all cargoes sent from the United States to
support the Korean Conflict went in U. S.-flag ships, and that 97% of all war
4
material and supplies in Vietnam got there via American-built, US-flag ships.
Writing in 1940 about a merchant ship "flight from the flag" during the
Civil War, an author summed up the need for a U. S. Merchant Marine neatly
in the single phrase, "to contribute to the safety and welfare of the United
5
States". He wen~ on to amplify with a discussion of the merchant marine
roles in keeping the U. S. out of wars other than its own, in implementing the
U.S. Navy, in promoting foreign markets and increasing U. S. trade, and in
providing employment and wages for labor in the many industries which contribute
to shipbuilding and ship opekations as well as to production, inland trans-
5.
portation and distribution of the goods that come and go in ships. Finally,
ne poi~ted out that the merchant marine was needed then to put idle capital
as well as idle men to work in productive industry.
These same roles are emphasized today in arguments for maintaining a
strong merchant marine. In addition, the existence of a U. S. Merchant Marine
of substantial size exerts a stabilizing influence on worldwide freight rates.
The presence of U.S. merchant ships on many trade routes increases competition
on tbese routes and benefits D!S. shippers. U.S. merchant ship availability
gives the United States negotiating leverage in opposing efforts of developing
countries to reserve the bulk of their cargoes for their own national flag
ships to carry, and it provides a safeguard against foreign shipping discrimina-
tion, which might otherwise make it more difficult for U. S. shippers to compete
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in world trade. A recent study of the im~act of the maritime industry on
the U. S. national economy concluded that the businesses of building and
operating shi.ps are vital economic assets to the nation's productive output.
The study made a pointed attempt to separate the economic impact from the
military significance of the industry, and produced figures to show that
maritime activities have contributed substantially (over $10 bi~lion in 1976)
to the U. S. gross national product. In the same year they generated 568,000
jobs, $7.4 billion in personal income and $2.2 billion corporate income. In
addition. they were responsible for $1.6 billion in federal and $.9 billion in
7
local taxes.
Thus, the merchant marine is needed as an essential element of maritime
power required by an island nation dependent upon movement of goods by sea.
It is a vital link with friends and allies, and a political asset throughout
6.
the world. Lt is certainly a stabil.izing influence on freight rates for U.S.
imports and exports, and it opens many conference doors. Contributions to
Gross National Product, to jobs, personal and corporate income, and to taxes
also provide additional incentives to maintain a U. S. merchant fleet in
being as a commercial enterprise. Of overriding importance however, is the
requirement to keep a merchant fleet which can continue to carry the goods
necessary to keep essential U. S. industries humming, and at the same time
can provide requisite numbers and types. ,of ships for vital roles in support
of military operations in war or other emergencies. If the U. S. merchant
fleet were to he kept large enough and versatile enough to satisfy military
support requirements calculated by the Department of Defense, plus the urgent
requirements of the civilian economy under conditions of emergency, so the
story goes, there would be enough ships to influence the terms and conditions
8
under which U. S. trade moves in non-emergency commercial situations.
Most writers stop at this point and declare the U. S. need for a merchant
marine to be two-fold: to carry a substantial amount of U. S. seaborne trade
under ordinary circumstances, and to provide the shipping support required in
war or other national emergencies. It is possible to convert the word
"substantial" to a percentage, and then to calculate what would be required
in terms of numbers and types of ships to achieve that percentage on each of
the essential U. S. trade routes. But there is little likelihood that these
figures could be gatned commercially by U. s. ships faced with stiff competition
from merchant ships of other nations. Nor is the probabillty high that there
would be a "fit" with wartime requirements. A more reasonable approach, in
terms of its possibility of implementation, would be to take the calculations
7.
of the Department of Defense as to the shipping required to support the most
likely and most d~\anding contingency in its long-range planning period, then
to add to that the best available figures as to urgent civilian sea trans-
portation needs for the same contingencies, to come up with a total number
of merchant ships required by the United States to support such an emerRency
situation. ~~en this procedure was followed by the Interagency Maritime Task
Force in 1965, they added DOD, Office of Emergency Planning and Office of
Emergency Transportation requirements to arri.ve at a total. need for 4.00 general
cargo ships of 15 knots, 600,000 bale cube capacity each; 100 bulk cargo
carriers of 16 knots, 22,000 deadweight ton capacity each; and 500 tankers of
15 knots, 115,000 barrel capacity (roughly T-2 tanker equivalents). 9
......
Not too much has changed since that IOOO-ship figure was calculated.
World power politics are about the same with regard to the most likely, most
demanding contingencies. Certainly a repeat of a Vietnam-type episode (which
never qualified as a national emergency) should be ruled out. The U.S. no
longer has its network of overseas bases where war supplies could be pre-
positioned in or near areas of most likely deployment of U. S. armed forces.
}~terial will have to be moved to areas of conflict over much longer distances
now. As a matter of fact, most resupply will have to come from U. s.
continental depot stocks. Supply support will be required in the operating
area sooner than would have been the case if a 90-day theater stockage objective
had been achieved. Modern merchant ships are larger) fa~ter and require much
less turnaround time than their World War II counterparts. These last two
factors, i.e. lack of overseas stocks and speed of delivery and tutnaround.
probably counteract one another to produce no increase or decrease in the
8.
overall number of ships required. Another feature which has changed is the
weight of organizational combat and support equipment for U. S. armed forces.
It is continually increasing. There is a lack of organic lift capability
in the active U. S. Navy today, and there are fewer naval auxiliaries available
to support combatant units. ~lerchant ships of specific types will me required
in roles not considered in earlier plans. Many of the Roll-on/roll-off ships
will be required to provide lift for tracked and Wheeled vehicles. Container-
ships might be modified to carry tanks (which don't currently fit in standard
containers). Tankers could be converted to helicopteT carriers, and LASH
barges would be needed for movement of heavy-·1ift cranes, locomotives and
harbor craft needed by the engineers in overseas locations. There is a need
for "handy sized" tankers (twice the size of the T-2), with an underway replenish-
ment capability to augment navy oilers in direct support roles for. navy task
forces. With the changes mentioned above in mind, and with some consideration
for higher attrition rates than those used in deriving earlier requirements,
the 1000-ship figure still appears reasonable as a goal. The basic division
of this requirement into 400 general cargo, 100 bulkers, and SOD tankers
probably is still valid also; but this will need further detailed study, as
will more specific uses and modifications of ships to mee~ the special needs
of military support. The requirement today is for modern ships, faster, of
greater unit capacity and of significantly increased versatility. The general
cargo shipping requirement would probably be accommodated by a mix of modern
general cargo ships. containerships, barge carriers and vehicle carriers
capable of 20 knots or better. The bulkers would also have tn make 20 knots,
and would be in the 20,000 to 50,000 deadweight ton capacity size. The tankers
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would all need at least 20 knots. Some of them must have a multi-product
transfer at aea capability. This 1000 ship merchant fleet then, is what the
United States needs to have readily availabl~, under positive control so it
can be diverted from peacetime commercial employment, or put on the line from
inactive status for immediate use in whatever shipping activity is considered
most vital to United States security and well-being at the time.
Thirteen years ago. loob U.S.-flag merchant ships was no big problem for
the United States to come up with in an emergency situation. The active,
privately-owned merchant fleet could account for just about all of the requiie-
ments. and there was still in existence a sizable World War-1I built merchant
fleet in reserve. Ten years ago the U. S. government itself owned 1,070
merchant ships, 1,008 of which were inactive. There would have been a manning
problem, and the inactive ships were obsolescent. But the ships were available
nonetheless. Today there are fewer ships in the privately-owned fleet, and
the number in the National Defense Reserve Fleet is less than 300, many of
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which are candidates for scrapping soon. How the Merchant Marine arrived
at this state of affairs is told 1n chapters which follow.
HISTORY OF THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE
The story of the United States Merchant Marine is generally told in
three phase&. each of which has its own distinctive characteristics and its
individual pattern of U. S. government interest and influence. These phases
are descri~ed as the great days of sail, from independence to the Civil War;
the period from the Civil War to World War I. when the U. S. merchant fleet
declined into insignificance; and the period from World War I to the present
time, characterized by great success and notable achievements in war and by
10.
decline and internal strife during periods of peace.
The U. S. Merchant Marine was given a running start from the early
practice of Great Britain of building and operating a good part of its global
merchant fleet in the colonies. The best design$ for ~Qoden sailing ships
were available in the United States when the nation was formed. There was
also a wealth of the basic raw material required (wood), the building yards
eKisted and there was an ample supply of skil~ed personnel to construct and
to man the ships needed to carry the new nation's commerce and to compete
successfully for other world trade. With some well-developed superior ship-
building techniques and a ready supply of qualified seamen, the United States,
in the first half of the nineteenth century, developed a decided edge in its
competition for world trade with its principal rival. the British merchant
fleet. In those glorious days of sail, dominated by the speedy American-built
and American-manned clipper ships, little government activity was required
to ensure the success of an industry in which the U. S. fleet had great
natural advantages on its own. The much smaller U. S. merchant fleet carried
one-third more cargo than its larger British rival in 1838, and more than 90%
12
of U. S. trade was being carried in U. S. merchant ships in 1850.
Ten years later. the situation was completely reversed. The introduction
of the tramp steamer on the world's trade routes, and the ravages of the Civil
War had hit with disastrous effect on the U. S. Merchant Marine. With no bars
to foreign transfar of ownership or registr~many U. S. companies sold or
transferred registration of their ships to British and Portuguese companies
to avoid the Confederate cruisers which took a terrible toll in sinkings of
U.S.-flag merchant ships. The U.S. flag all but disappeared from the sea
11.
during the Civil War and the period following it. The cruisers sank or
burned 110,000 tons of it. 800,000 tons were sold to foreign owners. Some
foreign powers issued licenses to American shipowners by which their ships
were placed under the registry and protection of these governments under
arrangements intended to be temporary, but which turned out to be permanent.
Congress not only refused to allow repatriation of ships which had been sold
temporarily to foreign companies, but also forced the permanent transfer of
ships which had remained under U. S. ownership, but had been registered under
13
other flags during the war. During almost all of this period, from the
Civil War to the start of World War I, the U.S.-flag merchant marine declined
into insignificance, and the ~.S. Congress apparently saw no reason to come to
its rescue. A massive government-sponsored shipbuilding program was carried
out in the United States to produce the ships required tor World War I. Under
this program 2,318 merchant ships were built, not for commerce or profit, but
rather to meet the military requirements at that time. Perhaps the most
significant piece of legislative action by the U.s. Congress in support of
the merchant marine during this second phase of its history w~s the Shipping
Act of 1916 which legalized U. S. participation in open Liner Conferences at
which shipping rates were established for the various trade routes, and the
available trade on these routes was apportioned among participating shipowners.
This act exempted the conferences. or shipping cartels designed to protect
participating shipping compan~es from outside competitors, from anti-trust
action under U. S. law. 14
The third phase or U. S. Merchant Marin,e history commenced with a fleet
of war-built ships in existence, but iLl-suited to competitive operation in
12.
commercial trade. It extends to' the present day. the labor movement in the
early part O't the period led to increased wages in the shipbuilding trades
and spread to include American seafarers. The result was that the costs to
build and to operate U. S. ships made it almost impossible for them to compete
for world tra.de without gov.ernment assistance.
It has been obvious U.S. government policy, throughout this third phase
at least, to foster, develop, and maintain the U.S. Merchant Marine. Three
major wars and numerous crises in which the U.S. was a participant should have
been cause enough alone to mainta.in a strong merchant marine; but there has
also been tremendous growth in world trade during this period (with the U.S.
generating the largest share), and it has been only sinCe World War II that
the United States has assumed a position of leadership in world politics and
economics. These factors have disposed the government even more toward
support for the U. S. snipping industry. Overall policy has indicated that
"dependence upon foreign shipping has to be avoided as far as possible". 15
Programs of support have varied over the years, but the theme has remained
basically the same. Underlying all of the major problems and the remedial
support programs of the federal government and its agenci~s has been recogni-
tion of two salient facts. First, the United States Merchant Marine cannot
now, nor will it be able in the foreseeable future, to operate in a free
competition. Second, the United States cannot, sustain its responsibilities
as a world power without its own merchant marine to carry the flag in peacetime,
16
and to count on for whatever roles it must play in times of emergency. -
The principal support programs for the U. S. Merchant Marine since 1936
have been based on subsidy-direct and indirect. There are programs of direct
13.
financial aid~ of indirect aid and preferential treatment and of national
regulatian and international agreements. A brief explanation of each of
these forms of governmental support is appropriate at this potnt. The
direct financial aid includes two types of subsidies - one for construction
and one for operation of U.S. merchant ships - plus tax benefits and loan
and mortgage guarantees. A construction differential subsidy (CDS) is
granted to equalize the cost to the shipowner to have his ship Duilt in the
United States as opposed to having it built in a foreign yard. Present buUd-
ing costs put U.S. yards 20-40% higher than European yards, which in turn
are about 20-40% higher for most stock vessels than those built in Japanese
yards. Ships built with CDS must 'be destined for use in the foreign commerce
of the United States, and must be reasonably calculated to replace worn out
or obsolete tonnage with new ships, or otherwise to carry out U. S. purposes
effectively. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 established CDS at a maximum of
50% of the cost of construction or reconstruction for that year. It was to
reduce to 35% by 1976, but has remained at about 45%. The 1970 act also
directs the CDS to the shipbuilder rather than to the owner, which is much
more realistic. $247 million was available in 1977 for CDS.
An operating differential subsidy (ODS) is granted to equalize the cost
of operating a U. S. flag ship with its f~reign competition. The amount paid
is based on a complex formula which considers "fair and reasonable" costs of
insurance. repairs. maintenance and wages of U.S. versus foreign officers and
crews. ODS ships must be built in the United States and their owners and
crews must be U. S. citizens. Each ship enters into a long-term contract
with the U.S. government to operate on a route designated as essential service.
14.
About one-third of tIle ships in the U.S. foreign fle~t receive an operational
subsidy, at a cost of 300 to 400 million dollars per year in recent years.
Another form of direct aid exists in the form of tax benefits. U. S.
ship operators can deposit money earned from vessel operations into a tax-
deferred fund, providing these funds are authorized for new ship construction.
The Capital Construction Fund Program had about $800 million assets in 1'977.
In line with this program, there are about $2-3 billion in Title XI mortgages
on ships and lighters. The U.S. government is committed to pay interest and
unpaid principal on construction loans and mortgages up to 87.5% of the cost
to the shipowner. The total authorization under Title XI was inc~eased to
$7 billion in 1975.
As other means of direct aid the U. S. government provides insurance for
war zone passage, and it pays all construction costs for "defense features"
built into merchant ships, such as fresh water washdown facilities, heavy
11lift cranes and deck strengthening for wartime gun emplacements.
Under the category of indirect aid nnd preferential treatment are the
Cabotage restrictions of the Jones Act of 1920, which guaranteed that only
ships of U.S. registry, owned and built in the U.S., would be allowed to
prosecute U. S. coastal trade. This protectionist measure ensures that there
~~ill be a significant U.S. merchant fleet in domestic waters, readily available
for other uses in emergencies. Cargo preference laws, specifically the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistanee Act of 1954 and the "50/50 Act"
olf 1961, reserve for U.S.-flag ships to carry, at least 50% of the tonnage
involved in the shipment of surplus U.S. agricultural products in food
18 dassistance program~ to third world countries. Still another form of in ireet
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aid is given the merchant marine in the programs of the ~1aritime Administration,
the Department of Transportation, the Army Corps of Engineers and the U. S.
Coast Guard. Grants to merchant marine academies and to other training insti-
tutions are a form of indirect subsidy.
There exists, finally, a vast array of regulations and restrictions (many
of them conflicting and causing more problems than they cure). Shipowners
have to be aware of the services offered by transportation, safety, environmental,
health, armed forces and commerce authorities at federal, state and port levels,
and must be prepared to abide by their rules. Conflicts have become most
evident recently in the rapid and far-reaching development of intermodal trans-
portation. Systems involving ship, rail and truck need regulations simplified
so as to apply all the way to a single container shipment over parts o~ the
system regulated by different departments and agencies of the government. Inter-
agency committees are now dealing with some of the knotty problems of freight
rates and documentation with a view toward easing the burdens on shipowners
operating intermodal systems.
Other specific programs which should have benefitted the U.S. Merchant
Marine consist of such things as "trade-aut-and build" and "charter and build"
programs of encouragement toward eliminating block obsolescence o~ a large
part of the war-built merchant fleet. Under the former program, a shipowner
would be authorized to transfer one ship "foreign" in return for a commitment
to build a Feplacemen t for U. S. - flag regis try. In the la t ter p'rogram, the
U.S. Government contracted to build Mariner-class tankers, then sold them to
private operators with a guaranteed long-term charter to carry military cargoes.
One of the stipulations in the trade-out-and-build program requir~s that the
16.
country to whose registry the war-built ship is transferred must agree to
return the ship to U. S. control in times of emergency. This limits the
transfers to Panamanian and Liberian registry, because these are the only
countries today who will agree to make ships under their flags available
19for requisition by other nations.
Merchant Marine Acts of 1920, 1936 and 1970 have had a profound effect
on the shape of the U. S. Merchant Marine and its supportive government
policy. With World War I at an end, the U. S. Congress passed rhe Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, and declared as national policy that l1it is necessary
for the national defense and for the proper growth of the foreign and domestic
commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater
portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time
of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and ,operated privately
by citizens of the United States ... " 20 R;istory would show that it takes
more than just a declaration of policy to maintain a U. S. merchant fleet
or the qualities and capabilities required. The U.S. merchant marine, unable
to compete because of the high cost of building and operating U.S.~flag ships,
was once again in a state of serious decline in the '30s. Some relief came
in the form of the Merchant "Marine Act of 1936. This act created a U. S.
Maritime Commission to form and implement overall national shipping policy.
Its prescriptions have been called the "Magna Carta of American Shipping".
They are ~et forth in summary in the following declaration:
"It is nec'essary for the national defense and development of its foreign
and domestic commerce that the United Stat,es have a merchant marine, (a).
17.
sufficient to carry its domastic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion
of the waterborne export and import foreign CQmmerce of the United States,
and to provide shipping on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of
such domestic and waterborne commerce at all times, (b). capable of serving
as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c).
owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United
States insofar as may be practicable, and (d). composed of the best-equipped,
safest and most suitable vessels constructed in the United States and manned
with a trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the
21
maintenance of such a merchant fleet".
merchant marine apply today,
These basic aims for the U. S.
Between 1939 and 1946, the U. S. Merchant Marine grew faster than ever
before in history, It came into its own in World War II as an indispensable
ann o,f defense. Older, slower, obsolescent ships were sunk early in the war,
but the U. S. building program produced ships faster than enemy submarines
and commerce raiders could find and sink them. As it turned out, almost
5600 new ships were delivered by prolific U. S. shipyards in 4 years of war.
'The Vnited States emerged from the war with the largest, most modern merchant
marine in the world. A good part of the fleet was owned directly by the V. s,.
government, having been controlled by the War Shipping Administration created
in 1942 by Executive Order to operate ships on its own accord in many trades.
The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 resulted in the sale of many surplus
government-owned ships. By priority they went to U.S. citizens first. Then
more than 1100 ships were sold to· British, Norwegian, French and Danish
18.
interests for foreign flag registry. There were still large numbers of
merchant ships under U. S. registry when. the Korean Conf1:i:ct started. That
was the only time in this century when it could truly be said that the United
States had a merchant marine which met its twin objectives of being adequate
for commerce and defense. 22
As time passed, U.S. war-built ships became less and less capable of
compet:ing in foreign trade. The fleets of "flags of convenience" states,
like Panama, Liberia and Honduras grew at the expense of the U. S. Merchant
Marine and sometimes with active U.S. government support as we have seen.
u. S. shipowners took advantage of opportunities to register in PANLIBHON
countries to avoid U. S. income taxes on the earnings of their ships! and to
get around requirements to build in the U.S. and to crew with U.S. nationals.
~~at is being proved, it seems, is that a merchant marine must be able to
make a profit or it won't stay around. In recent years, the U.S. Merchant
Marine has fallen to eighth place in the world with regard to overall size.
Participation of the U. S. merchant marine in its own nation's foreign trade
has fallen off in recent years by about one-third, and by as much as three-
23
quarters in the non-liner (irregular) segment of that trade.
The U.S. MeTchant Marine has been in a period of decline sinc.e the early
1960's. The extent of this decline was masked by the numbers of ships re-
quired to carry supplies for the Vietnam conflict. It was also slowed by
the growth of a revolutionary new ship called the containership, and by the
development of intermoda1 systems, with Sea Land, an American Company, taking
the lead. The expansion of the U.S. fleet associated with the war was
entirely made up of ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet. chartered
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to prLvate operators under General Agency Agreements. The active, privately-
owned and operated U.S.-flag fleet actually rose to over 1000 ships for the
years 1966, '67 &nd '68. T~en, with Vietnam winding down, it started to
24decline rapidly in 1969, to 598 ships by 1972. It has continued to
contract, but at. a mach slower pace since then. Meanwhile, the impetus of
the Merchant ~~rine Act of 1970, and the continuation of a containership
revolution into the '70s with U.S. technology showing the way, has led to
the development of a sizable fleet of versatile intermodal carriers as the
nucleus of a modern U.S. Merchant Marine. The '60s also saw some serious
debate in Congress and throughout the U.S. government as to what the needs
of the United States were for a merchant marine, and how best to achiev'e 1t.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 (PL469) was passed by the 9Ist Congress
of the United States on October 21, 1970. It is actually an amendment to the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, so it doesn't change the basic policy declarations
of the Magna Carta of American shipping. It aims at modernizing the merchant
marine by authorizing construction of 300 merchant ships in U.S. shipyards
over a 10 year period beginning 1 July 1971. The act encourages applications
of techniques and technology which can reduce shipbuilding prices. As was
mentioned earlier, it created the Capital Construction Fund to replace, rebuild
or add new ships. It also established the 50% CDS decreasing to 35% by 1976
and remaining there; and it increased the Federal Ship Mortgage, Insurance
program to $3 billion from an earlier level of $1 billion. The Merchant Ma~ine
Act of 1970 took a first step toward phasing out the foreign flag opera~ions
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of American shipowners who participate in the shipbuilding program. Under
its initial impetus, and with the application of technological advances to
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the continuing development of containerships, LASH ships, and Roll-on/roll-off
ships, the United States has, for the first time since before the Civil War,
put together a modern fleet of int!=rmodal carriers which so far are competing
well and without subsidies in world shipping. The overall U. S. merchant
fleet is not increasing in size however, and there are some pessimistic
forecasts appearing in the informed press these days as to lean days ahend
for U. S. shipbuilders after having built less than one-third the num~er of
ships authorized by the Congress. This could mean that more and more of the
existiof, active fleet will wind up at the ship-breakers I yards without replace-
ments of any kind.
STATUS OF THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE TODAY
The U. S. Merchant Marine today is two fleets. The largest of the two
is privately-owned and operated,. The other fleet is owned by the U. S.
gov~rnment and has a very sm~ll active component. and an inactive component
in the custody of the ~~ritime Administration. There also are a small numher
of merchant and naval auxiliary ships, civilian manned. and operated by the
Military Sealift Command (MSC), which also charters privately-owned ships
from time to time. All inactive ships are in National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF) sites on the Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific coasts maintained by the U.S.
Maritime Administration (MARAD). The privately-owned and operated fleet is
also divided into tW0 segments; a subsidized group, and a non-subsidized
group. The latter has twice the number of ships as the subsidized segment
and three times as much tonnage because of the preponderance of tankers in
this category. Most of the freighters and bulk carriers are remnants of the
war-built fle"et and their age exceeds that of competitive use£ulness. Overall
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the ships in the non-subsidized group are twice as old as those in the sub-
sidized segment. In 1975 there were 583 ships of 14.5 million deadweight
tonR (dwt) in the U. S. -flag privately-owned merchant fleet. They were owned
by 176 companies. Of these, 187 ships, representing 3.5 million dwt, and
averaging 9.6 years of age, were in the subsidized segment; and 396 ships,
of 11 million dwt, averaging 19.6 yeqrs old were in the non-subsidized
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.segment. As mentioned earlier, the U. S. merchant fleet: was eighth in
size aaong the world's fleets in 1977. It could count 868 ships, 298 of
which were laid up in the NDRF. The privately-owned part of that merchant
fleet tn 1977 consists of 311 dry cargo ships, 6 combination passenger/cargo
and transport ships, and 250 tankers, for a total of 567 ships. There are
68 USNS ships in the custody of the Department of Defense, operated by MSC
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in direct support of the military.
A new American merchant marine has been building in the 70's under the
stimulation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. and taking advantage of
technological developments in the industry. When the revitalization process
started, the whole U. S. merchant fleet was old, inefficient a~d losing business
rapidly to foreign competitors. Today, according to reports. the United
States Merchant Marine has the largest, most versatile fleet of intermodal
vessels in' the world. It consists of 105 containerships, 23 lighter and
barge-carrying vessels, and 13 Rol1-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vanships. 71 more
large ocean-going merchant ships including 31 tankers, 18 Liquified Natural
Gas (LNG) ships, 10 are carriers, 5 containerships, 3 integrated tug-barge
units, Z RO/RO vanships, and 2 ~eavy-1ift RO/RO vessels were on order er under
construction in U. S. shipyards in April 1977, and orders for 15 more such
ships were expected within the next 2 years. Of 66 subsidized ships ordered
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under the 1970 Act, 45 will be capable of direct support to the Armed Forces.
In addition, six LNG carriers have been certified fo~ use as military ships,
and 12 subsidized tankers of 200,000 dwt can be used for military support
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when deepwater ports are available.
A brief description of some of the newer ships in the merchant marine
inventory is appropriate here, for a better understanding later of how these
ships might be both good "fits" for commercial operations and valuable assets
in vital wartime roles.
As the name implies, a containership is specifically designed to carry
containers (steel boxes, 8 feet by 8 feet in CrOSS section and of varying
length - 20, 24, 3S and 40 feet). The containers themselves can be carried
on a truck tractor chassis, on a railroad flat car or on a barge. On board
ship they stack vertically in container cells with vertical guides. Topside
containers arc also stacked vertically on specialized hatch covers. Many of
the containerships in the fleet today are conversions of break-bulk freighters
and tankers. Most of these are non-self-sustaining. That is, they rely on
specialized container cranes ashore. A number of freighters were converted
to partial containership with facilities to carry both break-bulk cargo and
containerized cargo. Tbese ships are self-sustaining. The non-self-sustaining
Sea Land 5L-7 class containership i~ the most productive ship in service today.
It does 33 knots, at 38,800 dwt, with a capacity of 1,096 containers. The
5L-7's are key elements in a highly developed, highly integrated, sophisticated
incermodal system. The big, fast ships ply between major ports, from which
the smaller containerships deliver to minor ports. Ashore the system has
generated a need for acres of hardstand to store thousands of containers,
23.
and for specialized giant cranes, and electronic equipment and computers
for monitoring and control.
Containerships are not the only intermodal carriers coming off the line
today. The RQll-on/roll-off ship, with its ramps and large openings, moves
cargo on and off on wheels. The cargoes are either containers or tbey are
tracked or wheeled v,e.hlcle.s themselves. The RO/RO ship requires few facilities
ashore other than a pier to which the ramp can be fixed. It is compatible
with almost any cargo which can be carried on 'wheels or caterpillar tracks.
Barge carriers form a third category or new intermodal vessels. These
ships load, carry and unload specially designed barges or li.ghters, each of
\.,lhich can carry thousands of tons of cargo. They are basically of two types,'.
The Seabee's have huge elevators on the stern to lift barges to one of
several deck levels where hydraulic transporters move them forward on special
jacks. In the lighter-aboard-ship (LASH) version, smaller barges are lifted
over the stern by a special gantry crane. The crane then moves forward with
the barge and lowe~s it into a cell. Barge ships are intended to use the
inland waterway systems of the world to provide essentially door-to-door
service by water.
In the tanker category there are very large crude oil carriers (VLCC's)
and ultra-large crude carriers (ULCC's) on the drawing ooa~d up to half a
million dwt. A speciRlized type of tanker being built in quantity today is
the liquefied natural gas carrier or LNG ship. These are the most sophisticated
and most expensive ships in the inventory, and are designed to carry natural
~as liquefied under extremely low temperatures. They are built with extra-
ordinary safety features, and their crews are reportedly as well-trained as
24.
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those of U. S. nuclear submarines.
A final type of merchant ship deserving of comment here is the integrated
tug barge or notch barge ship. In this system tug and barges are designed
specifically for each other. The tug fits into the stern of the barge for
pushing. Some of the barges can carry up to 50,000 dwt. They are quite
versatile in combination with the tug~ and have the advan~age, not only of
using one tug for several barges~ but also for the f~ct that they require
only tug crews~ rather than the numbers and types of personnel which would be
required for a ship of the size created when the tug/barge combination is used.
The remaining ships of the active U. S. flag merchant fleet are traditional
freighters, ranging from newer ones, built in the early 1960 l s at 15-20,000
tons, most with a 20 knot capability; and World War II-built Victories. There
are only 6 passenger/cargo ships still in service. All of these are over 10
years old~ and the 2 are over 20. The tanker fleet is fairly large~ and
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fairly old. Half of the fleet of 250 tankers is over 20 years of age.
In the NJ)~F there are 298 ships. 100 of these are military auxiliaries.
Of the remainder, the majority (155) a~e fr~ighters (almost all are WW II
Victory hulls). There are also 18 transports or passenger/cargo ships.
Reportedly there are some ~RF ships which can be readied for active service
on very short notice (5-10 days) while the remainder are in various states of
preservation and repair, and could take up to six months to bring back to
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useful service.
Until very recently Cnited States shipyards were reported to be enjoying
healthy order books while foreign yards were failing for lack of future ship-
building orders. It was surmised that this was so because U. S. shipbuilding
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efforts in recent years had concentrated less on large tankers (which have
been grossly overbuilt "'Worldwide), and more on the smaller, faster, more
diversified ocean-going ships. This may have been the case through the early
part of 1978. Now, however, there are forecasts of an impending U. S. ship-
building slump. These are based on four recent events as follows: (1) The
Carter naval shipbuilding budget for fiscal '79 has been cut frem 30 ~hips
to 15; (2) Cargo preference legislation which was to have generated a need
for new tankers failed to get congressional approval; (3) The quest to get
an exception to the. Cabotage restrictions which would have re.quired o,il from
the Alaska pipeline to the Virgin Islands refineries to move in U. S. tankers,
also failed; and (4) There has been much uncertainty about building up for
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the movement and storage of LNG. It also now appears that the shipbuilding
boom which was created by the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 will end without
having come anywhere near to producing the 300 ships originally authorized.
Despite the fact that the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 extended the subsidy
to this segment of the fleet only 2 genuine bulk carriers have been delivered.
Meanwhile U.S.-flag participation in the dry bulk trade dropped to 1 percent
in 1977, and continues to decline. In the absence of any cargo prefer.ence
legislation, the portion of its own oil imports carried in U. S. tankers con-
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tinues to shrink from tha 1977 figure of 3.9%.
The U. S. maritime industry has suffered greatly from the fact that
separate and competing interests and constituencies have grown up with the
various forms of government support, and they can seldom agr€e on a single
course of action. The subsidized interests naturally push for increasing
direct subsidies; and the non-subsidized companies are against direct subsidies
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and for cargo preference legislation. The coastal shipowners guard Cabotage,
and have little interest in the rest of the program. Recently there have
been attempts to dra'W these varying factions closer together to work for
the good of the merchant marine as a whole. These attempts have met with
34limited success.
The overall size of the U. S. Merchant Marine continue9 to decline in
spite of the government subsidies and the recent encouragement to build new'
ships. At best the new ships being built are replacements for ships which
must be retired because of age. Block obsolescence of the war-built merchant
fleet continues to cause the active fleet to shrink, and it casts doubt on
the usefulness of the inactive ships, even those which can be readied for
active service on short notice. U.S. companies and their affiliates have a
large stake in foreign fle·ets. It is estimated that 25-30% of the Liberian
merchant fleet is U.S. owned, and that perhaps twice this percentage of the
Panamanian fleet is U.S. owned. As of 1 July 19'77,478 foreign ships, with
almost 3 times as much tonnage as the U. S. flag privately-owned fleet, are
counted on the Military Sea Conunand ship register as "under effective U. S.
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control" (EUSC). The very existence of these U.S.-owned and U.S.-operated
ships under foreign flags is indicative of one of the major ills of the U.S.
Merchant Marine which has existed for the past 50 years; that is, its inability
to operate in a free competition. Ships ar,e far too expensive to build in
u. S. shipyards, and U. S. wages for crewmen are far too high. With all the
subsidies offered by U. S. Government programs, American shipowners are still
going Eo "flags of convenience" registry with the ships they are going to usc
on foreign trade routes in competition with ships of other maritime nations.
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Operating with foreign crews and virtually tax-free, American-owned ships
under "flags of convenience" or "flags of necessity" as their owners prefer
to call them, exist in the only way American shipowners can compete with
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European merchant ships in the same trades.
r
MEETING REQUIREMENTS WITH TODAY'S FLEET
Against a 1000 ship requirement for.: emergency military and civilian
support, the United States Merchant Marine can muster 570 active U.S.-flag
merchant ships today. Approximately one-third of these arc engaged in coastal
trade and can be diverted immediately. The remaining two-thirds would have
to be withdrawn from service on essential trade routes, but could probably
be available in tiIDe to be effective. Activating the ships in the Nattonal
Defense Reserve Fleet becomes a more questionable prospec t with the pass'age
of time. These 298 ships include 100 military auxiliaries consigned directly
to U. S. Navy use. Manning beyond the first 100 ships with trained personnel
will be difficult. In any event, counting all of the U.S.-flag nerchant ships,
active and inactive, there is still a deficit of 132 ships in trying to meet
the shipping requirements of an emergency.
The answer today to the question, "wnere will these ships come fron?"
lies in the EUSC concept. The 478 ships considered to be under effective u.s.
control are ships which are American-owned and American-operatBd, but registered
in Panama, or Liberia, and manned with nationals of a third country. The EUSC
ships are owned by ~nerican compani~s or their subsidiaries. They are registered
in "flags of convenience" fleets with, the express permission of the U.S. Maritime
take advantage of the much moreAdministration to permit the shipowners to
f h countries, to avoid U. S. incomeliberal registration requirements 0 t ese
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etc.
program.
taxes on the earnings of these ships, and to get around requirements of U.S.-
d 'th U S nationals, that they adhere toflag registry that they be manne ' w~ ..-
"fi d 0 s operate on essential trade routes,
special standards, carry spec~ e carg e ,
Some of them are u.s. World War II-built ships, formerly registered
in the United States, but transferred foreign under the "trade-aut-and build"
Other ships of the EUSe fleet registered in flags of convenience
fleets are modern ships, mostly supertankers, built in foreign shipyards to
specifications which would not necessarily Il)eet U. S. standards, at much
lower cost than would have been the case had. they been built in U. S. yards,
and registered in Liberia or Panama because they could not qualify for U.S.
registry. They are operated under the same conditions regarding crew
nationality, tax exemptions and ather benefits, as do the ships transferred
from U.S.-flag registry. It should be noted at this point that U.S.-owned
ships are also registered in 13 foreign countries other than the "flags of
convenience" states, for various business reasons. As mentioned earlier,
the Maritime Administration limits the transfer of U.S.-flag ships to Panama
and Liberia today because they are the only nations who have agreed to make
such ships available to the U. S. in emergency situations. The other nations
have laws which bind ships to the. country in which they are registered in time
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of emergency.
There are those who voice considerable douht over the availability of
38Euse ships. American maritime unions call the concept "nonsense". Others
point out that even if such ships were available their best use would be as
replacements for U.S. flag ships withdrawn from essential commercial service
for military resupply, rather than as resupply ships per 5e. They contend
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that plans Lor using EUSe ships should consider that many of them might wind
up in the fleets of the countries of which their crews are nationals) and
that those which are available would not be of the right types - specifically
that there would not be enough llc l ean" tankers to carry the exotic fuels
required by modern armed forces. They also point out that since these ships
and their crews are alien) they could not be deployed or employed in support
of U.S. forces immediately. They also argue that the withdrawal of Euse
ships from the trade routes in which they are employed at the outbreak of an
emergency might be detrimental or even harmful to friends and allies. The
opponents of the EUSC doctrine also claim that the foreign crews would most
likely not come along with the ships and we would therefore compound a manpower
reserve which is already hard put to activate ships of the ~~RF. They point
to lessons from U. S. experience with Vietnam shipping. The conflict never
qualified as an emergency. so the Euse fleet could not be requisitioned. Instead
NRDF ships were activated and other ships were chartered. There were Reveral
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instances when foreign-manned ships refused to sail with Vietnam-bound cargoes.
Proponents point out that most of the Euse ships are manned with NATO
nationals; that they would, therefore, continue to be available to carry the
shipping of friends and allies even if delivered to home countries by their
cre\\Ts. They also point out that "flags of cOl1venien'ce" ships were made
available immediately during World War II and the Korean Conflict, and that
the nationality of the crews presented no major problems then.
To say the least, the availability of EUSC ships is Questionable, and
emergency requirements ought not to be met with questionable assets. To be
certain that its shipping needs can be met in an emergency, it will be prudent
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of the United States government to ensure the maintenance of an active
merchant fleet of U.S.-manned, U.S.-owned and operated ships, employed in
the commerce of the United States, either in the coastal trade or in U. S.
foreign trade. Ideally this active fleet should include numbers and types
of ships sufficient to carry at least the initial (first 3D-day) resupply
requirements of the military in an emergency situation. Review at some of
the specific requirements to move tracked and wheeled vehicles, to carry
tanks, to move helicopters and replace~ent aircraft, aA well as to serve as
naval auxiliaries indicates that, at best, there could be a marginal capability
to perform the military supply support role of the merchant fleet in an
emergency. But there are four other roles to be filled concurrently. First
there is the need to carry strategic materials and energy resources to support
the civilian economy and defense production. This would involve bulkers,
tankers and LNG ships perhaps, and could be a role appropriate for whatever
Euse ships are ultimately made available. Secondly, there is a role for ships
like the LASH's in direct military support operations. This will probably re-
quire LASH's and Seabee's far in excess of what would be required for regular
commercial operations. The third role is to function as combatants. with
modifications to carry and operate helicopters and VSTOL aircraft for example.
Finally, there is the role of continuing to operate in foreign trades in
support of fo,reign policy. This last role becomes a problem only if numbers
of ships are not available for the first two roles. and all U. S. flag ships
have to be withdrawn from foreign trade.
It appears that the U.S.-flag merchant fleet today would find itself far
short of meeting the IDDO-ship requirement, and unable to fill many of the
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roleS assigned to it in an emergency situation. 'Current trends indicate
that the situation, without massive assistance, will continue to deteriorpte.
Some action is required soon to reverse the trend of decreasing numbers in
the active U. S. privately-owned merchant fleet. At the same time, action
must be taken now to replace the obsolescent and obsolete ships in the NDRF
with moder~ merchant ships capable of providing effective augmentation for
the active fleet iIT a reasonable time. A source of trained manpower must be
found. and some action should be taken to eliminate the need for an EUSC
fleet. In the meantime, that source should be counted on only for requirements
which occur beyond the first four months of an emergency situation.
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
Although one segment of 'the United States Merchant Marine, its intermodal
fleet~ is currently competing effectively for world trade on its own, one can
predict that this situation will continue only so long as the U. S. can stay
ahead technologically in containership development and in other intermodal
ships operation. When other maritime nations obtain similar ships and learn
to operate them efficiently. the wage differential between U.S. seamen and
those of other nationalities will predictably come to the fore again to make
that segment non-competitive without some form of government subsidy, support
or involvement.
The U.S. government has been deeply involved in merchant marine support
since World War I. At various times it has served as a participant in merchant
marine operations, as it does now in a very limited way with the USNS ships
and charters admintstered by the Military Sealift Command. During World War II,
the government, through the War Shipping Administration. participated as both
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owner and operator of merchant ships. retaining war-built ships on government
roles as they were deliver'ed, and chartering others to haul military cargoes.
The government has requisitioned ships when they were required in the past.
It has also demi~e-chartered ships to private operators. The U. S. gove~nment
has always been a participant in the industry as a shipper of cargo. During
World War II. when private underwriters were unwilling to write war risk
The government has also been a promoter of the merchantinsurance business.
insurance, the War Shipping Administration got directly into the marine
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marine in the past. An example is the Mariner-class tanker program where
the U. S. government had 35.000 dwt tankers built to spec.ifications for sale
to private operators. who operate them on long-term charters to the Military
Sea Comm~nd. Mercillint Marine Academies (national and state) are other examples
of U.S. governmen't promotion of the merchant marine. From facts as we have
reviewed them to this point in this paper. there appears to be no way to keep
a U. S. Merchant Marine in being today without heavy U. S. government involv·ement
and massive support.
The first alternative course of action which must be examined is the
possibility of establishing complete government ownership and operation of the
U. S. Merchant Marine. This would be a most drastic action. It would be ex-
tremely difficult and costly to implement. There would be many powerful shipping
interests and coalitions opposed to any government takeover of private enter-
prises and private property. Such action would probably be deemed unconstitu-
tional in the first place. If not J adequate compensation would have to be
made for the taking by the government of ships, equipment J port and control
activities; i.e. all physical property. There would also have to be some
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compensation for los.t earnings in many qegments of the maritime .industry.
Government ownership of the U. S. merchant fleet is an action which would
be completely eontrary to one of the major goals of long-term U. S. policy
expressed in the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920, 1936 and 1970. A privately-
owned fleet is a common objeetive of these acts. Any move toward government
takeover would reverse the current trend away from government ownership. The
U. S. has preferred to re,place formerly-government-owned ships with ones built
under government subsidy and contract and then sold to private ownership with
guaranteed long-term charters moving military cargo. There is probably a
reasonable compromise in partial government ownership (and operation from time
to time) of ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Numbers might be
increased in this category, and the mix of ships can change as modern ships
become available and specific requirements are determined. Arrangements might
be made to swap activated NDRF ships for p~ivately-owned ships when the former
might more-appropriately fill a commercial need. It might also be feasible to
take into the NDRF, with compensation and promise to return, ar.y privately-owned
modern U. S. merchant ship going into lay-up for lack of cargo for periods as
short as 3 months. Complete government ownership must be ruled out as a
reasonable alternative in the absence of a bona fide national emergency.
However, an increase in the scope of government ownership and operation of
ships in the NDRF appears appropriate and desirable at this time.
A second alternative to be considered is to grant U. S. shipowners authority
to have their ships for U.S. flag J;egistry built in foreign shipyards. This
was the preferred course of action in John KILGOUR's 1975 study of national
.. - Ii d' 41marlt1me po cyan 1ndustrial relations. According to Kilgour the U. S.
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Merchant Marine was forever committed by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
to having to op.erate with extremely high-cost equipment, (ships built in the
United States). This put shipowners into situations in which they could not
afford to modernize or to take advantage of advanced technology in ship
design and in shipbuilding. Kilgour argued for unlinited foreign building,
but offered a build-one-foreign, build-one-U.S. clause, as perhap.s the best
way to get the non-subsidized segment of the U. S. Merchant Marine modernized.
Merchant shipbuilding orders generally account for about 20% of the average
annual workload of U. S. shipyards. Building U. S. 'Navy ships accounts for
almost all of the remaining 80%. Jobs would be lost in the shipbuilding trades
if foreign building were authorized, although the number would not be so large
with the ~odification mentioned above to unlimited overseas building. The
U.S. Navy shipbuilding and conversion program could expand to take up some of
the slack from building merchant ships foreign. With a global slump in ship-
building being forecasted gloomily in the New York Times and the Journal of
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Commerce, there might be considerable cost savings as incentives to order
ships built in both U.S. and foreign yards if such authorization were given.
The risk to the shipowners, from the possibility of overbuilding for the trade,
would be minimized by the promise of government compensation and lay up in
the NDRF for ships not actually required in commercial trade when delivered.
The main objective would be to replace the obsolescent and obsolete ships in
the private sector first, th~n in the NDRF, and to increase the size of the
overall U. S. Merchant Marine by at least 100 ships. It would be desirable
to have some stimulation for building these additional ships come from
knowledge that there is a market for their employment at a profit to the
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shipowners. This leads to a requirement for an ambitious program to
increase the current U. S. share of world trade.
Continuation of, and increase in subsidies is a third alternative.
The existing subsidies have not been effective in offsetting the declining
trend of the U. S. Merchant Marine. Yet subsidies of some sort are necessary
today if a merchant marine of any reasonable size is to be maintained. Efforts
to reduce the amount of the construction differential subsidy are wel~-a~med.
IL might be well also to remove some of the long-term commitments which are
made in order to receive an operating differential subsidy. Still under the
subsidy program. tax benefits continue to be an attractive way of encouraging
conversion of old and acquisition of new ships. Shipowners with ships
registered under "flags of convenience", thereby avoiding all U. S. taxes
on these ships, should not be permitted also to get a tax break for ships they
own under U. S. registry. The Federal Ship Loans and 1'Iortgage Guarantees
under Title XI War Risk Insurance, and the policy of the U. S. Government paying
costs for National Defense features of merchant ships all rate continuation
for the stimulation they provide for new construction. Cabotage restrictions
have a firm basis in law now. They provide security from espionage and sabotage
which might be possibl~ if foreign ships €lperated in domestic trade. The
coastal segment of the U. S. merchant fleet provides the first line of readily
available merchant ships for military support operations in the event of war.
Additional cargo preference legislation is a possibility. It is a course
of action whi0h has been considered closely by the Congress and the Administra-
tions of recent years. Legislation passed by Congress in 1974 which would have
allotted 30% of U.S. oil imports to U.S. flag ships was vetoed by President
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Ford. Congr.ess, in 1977, failed to pass legislation favored by President
Carter which would have increased the percentage of oil imports to the
United States reserved for carriage by U. S. tankers, from 3.9% in 1977 tOr
9.5% by 1982. It was felt in both cases that the legislation would be
inflationary, that it would antagonize friends and allies, and would set
a precedent for other countries to enact stronger cargo preference legislation
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of their o~.
Increased government ownership, and more involvement with the NDRF and
the private sector; a limited authorization to have ships built in foreign
yards; and continuation of direct and indirect subsidies cannot cure the ills
of the U. S. Merchant Marine by themselves. There is a need for action to
bring the diverse factions of the maritime industry together in support of
a common goal in the best interests of the U. S. merchant fleet. There is
also a pressing need to fin~d new markets, and to support the merchant marine
in treaty arrangements and agreements. Finally, the U. S. government must
join with the industry in creating good public relations for the merchant
marine at home and in promoting its use abroad.
Whatever the overall program finally adopted to improve the status of
the U. S. Merchant Marine, it should have as its primary goal the achievement
of a lOOO-ship modern merchant fleet, counting both active and inactive
portions. Taking this one step further, there should be enough special type
ships available. whether in commercial service or in the NDRF. to transport
known requirements for such things as tanks, helicopters. replacement aircraft
and other oddly configured cargoes.
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PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE
The program to achieve a lOOO-ship modern merchant marine~ and to keep
it available once acquired, must start with legislation to modify the
,existing effective Merchant Marine Acts to make foreign shipbuilding possible,
and to authorize swap and turn-in procedures for private owners and the ~~RAD
administrators of th~ NDRF. An appropriately constituted government/industry
task group should then be formed with specific direction, first of all, to
bring the diverse factions of the merchant marine together in working toward
a common goal. The task group would then be charged with working out the
inter-agency conflicts hampering growth of intermodal systems, and with
recommending a single set of conforming rules and regulations for new
teclmology and procedures.
An information service, should be established to gather and project data
on volumes of cargo and shipper preference~so the merchant marine can take
full advantage of world market conditions in seeking to carry as large an
amount of world trade as possible. At the same time, a good public relations
program should be put together to "sell" U. S. and foreign shippers on using
the u.s. Merchant Marine for their shipping.
With regard to the specific goal of building the Merchant Marine up to
1000 ships, the following step-by-step process is proposed:
1. Develop a "shopping list" of the types of ships most urgently required
in the merc.hant fleet, either because they are not there now, or because they
are there in insufficient numbers or in antiquated model~.
2. Conduct a search of world trade markets to see if a commercial need
exists or can be developed on a long-term basis for the ~hip types on the
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shopping Ust.
3. Where ther~ is a reasonable use, convince shipowners that they
should invest in it. Some sort of government guarantee could he issued to
the effect that, if a ship were to be laid up within a certain period of
time after delivery, the government would take the ship into the ND~F and
ensure that the owner didn't lose on his investment.
4. Where no commercial market is found, arrange for a contract to be
made by the U. S. government to build ships for input directly to the NDRF
on completion, against a day when they might be in demand commercially.
5. Take the list of "shortages" and programmable replacement actions
for older ships, and create a long-range multi-ship building program which
will eventually replace all old, obsolescent ships in the current private
fleet and government inventory; and will, in addition add the 100 new ships
required to fill out a lOOO-ship fleet. The program can tben be extended
to maintain 1000 ships as long as the figure is valid.
Government subsidy programs can remain basically unchanged. Efforts
should be made to elicit investment of both private and government capital
in this overall merchant marine development program. Operating requirements
of both commerce and defense should be recognized, but where private investment
is concerned, there must always be an opportunity to make a profit.
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